{"id":15159,"date":"2016-10-10T09:20:28","date_gmt":"2016-10-10T09:20:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/kasperskydaily.com\/b2b\/?p=6126"},"modified":"2020-12-21T19:35:58","modified_gmt":"2020-12-21T17:35:58","slug":"infected-encryption-mitigate","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/infected-encryption-mitigate\/15159\/","title":{"rendered":"Mitigate threats from infected encryption software"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>As computer users become increasingly concerned about data privacy and protection, they\u2019re turning to encryption software to enhance security. Unfortunately, cybercriminals are always on the lookout for a new trend to exploit and have developed malware that gives them access to encryption software \u2013 and the data it\u2019s supposed to protect.<\/p>\n<p><strong><em>What happened?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In the summer of 2016, a cyberespionage actor we call StrongPity infected some open source encryption installers. In addition to distributing infected installers, they also used watering holes targeting arbitrary users, mostly in Italy and Belgium. This tactic is similar to the one used by Dark Hotel to spread across Asia. Now it\u2019s Europe\u2019s turn.<\/p>\n<p>Our analysis indicates that the StrongPity actor is not only\u00a0determined, but well-resourced and fairly innovative\u00a0as well. Over the summer, they compromised both WinRAR (for its file encryption capabilities) distributor sites, and created a fake mirror image of the sourceforge TrueCrypt site (for open source full disk encryption).<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-pullquote\"><p>Mitigate #threats from infected #encryption software.<\/p><a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fkas.pr%2FY8Zv&amp;text=Mitigate+%23threats+from+infected+%23encryption+software.\" class=\"btn btn-twhite\" data-lang=\"en\" data-count=\"0\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Tweet<\/a><\/blockquote>\n<p>It\u2019s not the first time official distributives of specialized software have been spoofed. In early 2014 Crouching Yeti trojanized legitimate\u00a0ICS-related software\u00a0installers such as industrial camera drivers; the malware was spread by compromising legitimate device driver sites and replacing official installers with the trojanized ones.<\/p>\n<p>This summer, StrongPity adopted the same tactic. First, they set up a domain name (ralrab[.]com)\u00a0mimicking\u00a0the legitimate WinRAR distribution site (rarlab[.]com). Then they placed links on legitimate European distribution sites to redirect users to malware-infected installers on a new domain:<\/p>\n<p><\/p><div id=\"attachment_6146\" style=\"width: 1034px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-6146\" class=\"wp-image-6146 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskydaily.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/103\/2016\/10\/06020524\/winrar.be_SP_introduced-2-1024x700.jpg\" width=\"1024\" height=\"700\"><p id=\"caption-attachment-6146\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Winrar[.]be site with \u201crecommended link\u201d leading to malicious ralrab[.]com.<\/p><\/div>StrongPity also\u00a0redirected users of popular software sharing sites to its trojanized installers. The group redirected visitors from the tamindir[.]com site to their attacker-controlled site at true-crypt[.]com \u2013 a complete replica of the legitimate TrueCrypt site.\n<div id=\"attachment_6147\" style=\"width: 1003px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-6147\" class=\"wp-image-6147 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskydaily.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/103\/2016\/10\/06020523\/tamindir.truecrypt_redirect.png\" width=\"993\" height=\"920\"><p id=\"caption-attachment-6147\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Tamindir TrueCrypt page with malicious redirection.<\/p><\/div>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>StrongPity\u2019s malware droppers are often signed with unusual digital certificates. These modules drop multiple components that give the cyber-criminals complete control of the victim\u2019s system and (the reason for choosing encryption software) effectively steal disk contents. \u00a0To date, over 1000 systems have been detected with a StrongPity component or attempting to download a poisoned\/trojanized installer.<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"twitter-pullquote\"><p>A new\u00a0#malware gives criminals\u00a0access to #encryption software and the data it is supposed to protect.<\/p><a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fkas.pr%2FY8Zv&amp;text=A+new%C2%A0%23malware+gives+criminals%C2%A0access+to+%23encryption+software+and+the+data+it+is+supposed+to+protect.\" class=\"btn btn-twhite\" data-lang=\"en\" data-count=\"0\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Tweet<\/a><\/blockquote>\n<p>You can read a detailed report about the operation <a href=\"https:\/\/securelist.com\/blog\/research\/76147\/on-the-strongpity-waterhole-attacks-targeting-italian-and-belgian-encryption-users?utm_medium=blg&amp;utm_source=kb_post_161010&amp;utm_campaign=ww_promo\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">here<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Protective measures<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Once again, we\u2019re seeing an attack in which previously reliable products are compromised, along with the official vendor or localization companies\u2019 websites being used to re-direct users to malicious sites. Our prediction is that the volume of malware masquerading as a legitimate distributive will only grow, making quality software allowlists an important component of effective malware detection mechanisms. We\u2019ll never tire of repeating that only multi-layered security solutions really work.<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s worth noting that attacks launched through compromised ICS vendor websites and installers could be classified as \u201cindustry targeted\u201d \u2013 after all, who needs that kind of software, other than industrial businesses? This time spoofed encryption software sites and their trojanized installers mostly targeted victims\u2019 encrypted data and communications.<\/p>\n<p>Correctly installed protection mechanisms could catch attack malware modules in their early stages. Defensive measures should take heuristics, machine learning and all other current corresponding algorithms into account. In Kaspersky Lab\u2019s case, all required measures are implemented in Kaspersky Endpoint Security and its small businesses counterpart, Kaspersky Small Office Security.<\/p>\n<p>In StrongPity\u2019s case, the tools chosen by the threat actors \u2013 WinRAR and TrueCrypt \u2013 are used mainly by people who don\u2019t want to spend a lot of money on encryption. While it\u2019s highly unlikely that enterprises would choose such software, home users and smaller businesses do. And they\u2019re the ones who become victims of their trust in software that was developed to protect their data. Our advice: trust no one and implement your security properly.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Cybercriminals are always on the lookout for a new trend to exploit and have developed malware that gives them access to encryption software. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":611,"featured_media":15317,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1999,3021],"tags":[872,261,2466,2097,1277],"class_list":{"0":"post-15159","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-business","8":"category-smb","9":"tag-cyberespionage","10":"tag-encryption","11":"tag-strongpity","12":"tag-truecrypt","13":"tag-winrar"},"hreflang":[{"hreflang":"en-za","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/infected-encryption-mitigate\/15159\/"},{"hreflang":"ru","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.ru\/blog\/infected-encryption-mitigate\/15061\/"},{"hreflang":"x-default","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com\/blog\/infected-encryption-mitigate\/15159\/"},{"hreflang":"en-au","url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.com.au\/blog\/infected-encryption-mitigate\/15159\/"}],"acf":[],"banners":"","maintag":{"url":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/tag\/cyberespionage\/","name":"cyberespionage"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15159","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/611"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15159"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15159\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":28455,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15159\/revisions\/28455"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/15317"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15159"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15159"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.kaspersky.co.za\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15159"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}